I've decided to start tracking circuit splits I come across in Fifth Circuit opinions I cover on the blog. Here are NINE I've seen so far:
- In Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113-14 (2018), the Supreme Court held that “[a] putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time or place . . . is not a ‘notice to appear under [8 U.S.C. §] 1229(a).'" The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have all refused to extend Pereira beyond the stop-time rule context. See Pierre-Paul v. Barr, No. 18-60275 (5th Cir. July 18, 2019); Nkomo v. Attorney Gen., No. 18-3109, 2019 WL 3048577, at *2-3 (3d Cir. July 12, 2019); Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2019); Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101, 11-12 (2d Cir. 2019); Soriano-Mendosa v. Barr, 768 F. App’x 796, 801-02 (10th Cir. 2019); Santos-Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2019); Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2019); Leonard v. Whitaker, 746 F. App’x 269, 269-70 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Mauricio-Benitez, 908 F.3d at 148 n.1). Creating some tension with those holdings, the Seventh Circuit has partially accepted the Pereira-based argument that a notice to appear that does not contain the time or place is defective. See Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 966 (7th Cir. 2019). Ultimately, however, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the immigration court’s jurisdiction was not affected because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 is a claim-processing rule. Id.
- The Board of Immigration Appeals has concluded that an immigration court can cure a notice to appear that is defective under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) by subsequently mailing to the alien a notice of hearing containing the time and date of the initial hearing. See Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441, 445-46 (BIA 2018). The BIA also observed that the relevant regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14, “does not specify what information must be contained in a ‘charging document’ at the time it is filed with an Immigration Court” and does not “mandate that the document specify the time and date of the initial hearing.” Id. at 445. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that “[t]he BIA’s interpretation does not conflict with the [Immigration and Nationality Act] and is consistent with the regulations.” See Pierre-Paul v. Barr, No. 18-60275 (5th Cir. July 18, 2019); Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2019); Molina-Guillen v. Attorney Gen., 758 F. App’x 893, 898-99 (11th Cir. 2019); Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2019); Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 314-15 (6th Cir. 2018). The Seventh Circuit disagrees. See Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 966 (7th Cir. 2019). The Ninth Circuit appears to side with the Seventh, though its precedent on this issue is not crystal clear. Compare Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2019) (approving the BIA's interpretation) and Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396, 405 (9th Cir. 2019) (defective notice to appear cannot be cured). Lopez attempted to reconcile its holding with Karingithi by emphasizing that Karingithi focused on the IJ's jurisdiction over the removal proceedings at issue.
- HUD promulgated regulations establishing a burden-shifting framework for FHA disparate-impact claims. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c). Some circuits have held that the Supreme Court adopted HUD's framework in Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015). See See Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 618 (2d Cir. 2016) (“The Supreme Court implicitly adopted HUD’s approach....”)). Others insist that the Court modified the HUD standard or even rejected it alogether. See Inclusive Cmty. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Property Co., 920 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2019) ("We read the Supreme Court’s opinion in ICP to undoubtedly announce a more demanding test than that set forth in the HUD regulation."); Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Ltd. P'ship, 903 F.3d 415, 424 n.4 (4th Cir. 2018) (concluding “[w]ithout deciding whether there are meaningful differences between the frameworks, ... [that] the standard announced in [ICP], rather than the HUD regulation[,] controls our inquiry.”).
- The Fifth and Fourth Circuits review agency interpretations of contractual agreements de novo. See, e.g., Texas Tech Physicians Associates v. HHS, 917 F.3d 837, 844 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing cases); Burgin v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 120 F.3d 494, 497-98 (4th Cir. 1997). Several other circuits apply the Chevron framework to (at least some) agency interpretations of contracts. See Bos. Edison, Co. v. FERC, 233 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2000) (“FERC is entitled to some deference in construing contracts where the sales are subject to FERC regulation.”); Amoco Prod. Co. v. FERC, 765 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1985); City of Kaukauna v. FERC, 214 F.3d 888, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2000); Wash. Urban League v. FERC, 886 F.2d 1381, 1386 (3d Cir. 1989) (“We generally defer to an agency's interpretation of agreements within the scope of the agency’s expertise, and the case for deference is particularly strong when the agency has interpreted regulatory terms regarding which it must often apply its expertise.” (citation omitted)); Muratore v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 222 F.3d 918, 923 (11th Cir. 2000) (extending Chevron to an Office of Personnel Management’s interpretation of a federal employee's health insurance contract; factors included delegation, expertise, and uniformity); Braintree Elec. Light Dep’t v. FERC, 667 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (applying Chevron deference to FERC interpretation of settlement agreement involving electric reliability).
- In In re Benjamin, 924 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. May 10, 2019) (Clement, Graves, Oldham), the Court interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) to strip federal jurisdiction under only the statutory provisions it lists–28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346—and not under unlisted ones, such as bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit on the less-popular side of a growing circuit split regarding the scope of § 405(h). The Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the provision bars review of not only of claims brought under §§ 1331 and 1346 but also § 1334 (and others). The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case from the 11th Circuit raising this issue.
- The Fifth Circuit's holding in Louisiana Real Estate Appraisers Board v. FTC, 917 F.3d 389 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2019) (King, Higginson, Costa) (per curiam), that while the collateral-order doctrine might permit immediate review of certain administrative decisions, it doesn’t apply to an FTC order denying state-action immunity to a state agency alleged to have violated federal antitrust laws expressly rejects the First Circuit’s holding that the doctrine is “generally applicable” to administrative decisions.
- In W.M.V.C. v. Barr, No. 17-60753 (5th Cir. June 7, 2019) (Smith, Willett) (King, dissenting), the Fifth Circuit held that for purposes of determining whether the government's position was "substantially justified" under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the Court must evaluate the government's position under the totality of the circumstances. In so holding, the majority claimed to be "join[ing] the vast majority of our sister circuits," and added that only the D.C. Circuit had rejected its view. The dissent saw the state of the law differently, insisting that “the majority stands alone with the Seventh Circuit," in taking a position that "the Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits" have rejected.
- In Shah v. Azar, 920 F.3d 987 (5th Cir. Apr. 12, 2019) (Higginbotham, Dennis, Costa), the Fifth Circuit joined four other circuits in holding that physicians do not have a protected property interest in continued participation in Medicare. See Parrino v. Price, 869 F.3d 392, 397-98 (6th Cir. 2017); Erickson v. U.S. ex rel. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 67 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1995); Koerpel v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 858, 863–65 (10th Cir. 1986); Cervoni v. Sec'y of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 581 F.2d 1010, 1018–19 (1st Cir. 1978). The Fourth Circuit has held otherwise. Ram v. Heckler, 792 F.2d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 1986).
- In Melendez v. McAleenan, No. 18-20341 (5th Cir. June 27, 2019) (Barksdale, Southwick, Haynes), the Court held that that an alien is deemed to have “maintain[ed] lawful status” under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4) only during the “period in which [he] is granted temporary protected status.” The Court acknowledged that its interpretation of the statute contradicted that of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Medina v. Beers, 65 F. Supp. 3d 419 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
CA5 Circuit-Split Roundup UPDATED July 25, 2019